UCI has a well established methodology for developing the requirements for sophisticated automation systems and the supporting information infrastructure and communication networks. This methodology is as follows:
Gather Information
UCI meets with the client to determine the nature and extent of his requirements. This process can take many forms, many of which are use simultaneously, including:
Questionnaire UCI develops a Questionnaire or Checklist, which is used during the first kickoff meeting to determine the scope of the requirements. We discuss all the items on the checklist with the utility’s project team. Interviews UCI interviews key utility staff, including the system operators, the computer support personnel, the telecommunications personnel, planning personnel, supervisors of field crews, managers, and other staff who will utilize the new technology. We cover how they currently perform their jobs, as well as what new functions they will need to perform in the future. Our discussions range from the utility’s mission statement, to current operational and technical problems, to “blue sky” wishes, to what color the displays should use to show transmission lines.
Documentation
UCI requests documentation from the utility that covers their existing system capabilities, those external systems which must be interfaced, the utility’s operational procedures, and any future plans for expansion or upgrading of system capabilities. Often this documentation is incomplete or obsolete, so we supplement it with discussions and questions to key personnel.
Determine Conceptual Design and Functional Requirements
Based on the information gathered, UCI determines the conceptual design and functional requirements. This step is crucial before we start to prepare specifications which vendors will bid on. Often utilities are familiar with doing certain processes in certain ways, with different departments assigned to perform precise tasks. However, if the utility were simply to automate these tasks, many opportunities for improving efficiency and accuracy would be lost. Rather than just automating each task, the entire process should be analyzed and re-engineered. For instance, if each department in isolation were to automate the collection and storage of just the information they need, and assume that exchange of data with other departments would remain as paper reports, then the potential efficiency of the overall process would be seriously compromised.
We therefore develop a conceptual design which covers not only the current process under consideration, but also other utility processes which may sooner or later need to be integrated more closely with the current process. We cover many aspects, such as:
SCADA Systems
Network Analysis applications – real time and study mode, optimization
Generation applications – real time and planning, unit commitment
Market applications for the Energy Management System – interchange scheduling, transaction evaluation, power flow assessment of potential transactions, OASIS (in the North American market)
Market applications for the Energy Purchasers – power brokering system, OASIS, transaction management system
Interfaces between Control Centers, either within a utility or between utilities
Interfaces within Operational Systems, such as the Dispatchers Power Flow, Optimal Power Flow, Operators Training Simulator
Interfaces between the Transmission Operations System (EMS) and Distribution Operations Systems (DMS)
Interfaces to the Utility’s Corporate Network and the Public Internet
UCI recognizes that no system should be an island. The interfaces determined during the conceptual design must be enabled over well-designed communications infrastructure. The problem of integrating disparate systems has led to much discussion, and one basic truth. The key to integration is the use of Open Systems and International Standards for interfaces between systems. Over the years, the computer and telecommunications industries have developed parts of the solution. They have designed many computer and communication standards for linking computers together in a variety of configurations. Vendors who use these standards can interconnect their systems. The most common standards include:
Lower layer communication protocols: Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), Frame Relay, Sonet, Ethernet LANs, TCP/IP
Networks with standard routing protocols: Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
Upper layer communication protocols: File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hyper Text Transmission Protocol (HTTP)
Data exchange between databases: Comma-delimited flat files, Sequential Query Language (SQL), Remote Database Access (RDA), Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML), eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
ICCP for inter control center data exchanges
DNP 3.0 for traditional communications with RTUs
However, these standards only address methods of transporting bits and bytes between computer systems. They do not address the methods of identifying what the bits and bytes mean. The task of uniquely identifying data as it is exchanged among many different systems has only started to be addressed in the last few years. The basic concepts were designed in the computer industry, and are based on Object Models and Middleware concepts. Middleware allows disparate systems, built by different vendors on different platforms at different times, to exchange information using a common methodology and interface, without needing to develop special methods for each vendor or platform.
Object model standards have been developed specifically for the utility industry by the IEC TC57 working groups. These standards include:
Common Information Model (CIM)
Generic Interface Definition (GID)
Device object models based on IEC 61850: for substation automation equipment, distribution automation equipment, power quality, distributed energy resources, hydro power plants, and a growing number of other power system devices.
Security is also a major aspect in designing the communications infrastructure. With systems increasingly networked, and with competition adding an incentive to have unauthorized access to data, security must be designed into the infrastructure from the beginning.
Alternatives in system architecture will be formulated based on the functional requirements and a set of system design criteria. Such criteria will include but not be limited to: